

EXTERNAL STUDY

**LIMITS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF UN-EU
RELATIONS IN PEACE OPERATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR DPKO**

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Executive Summary

A dialogue between the UN and the EU has led to improved cooperation in crisis management, ...

... but has not increased EU contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.

The EU launched three operations under the 'Petersberg Tasks' in 2003.

Although willing to cooperate with the UN in peace operations, the EU may not find this a priority, as it is pursuing an independent policy.

However, cooperation in other crisis management activities, and UN involvement in EU-led operations will continue.

In 2000, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) initiated a dialogue on possible cooperation in the field of crisis management, at a time when the UN was going through a process of reform of its peace operations and the EU was building capacities for crisis management through the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). After some initial misunderstandings (in particular, about the compatibility between ESDP and UN peace operations), that dialogue led to some significant and positive achievements (points of contact, regular meetings, better understanding of respective activities and concerns), but did not lead to increased contributions by the EU or EU member states to UN peace operations.

In 2003, the EU launched its first three operations that fall under the 'Petersberg Tasks': the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Operation Concordia in Macedonia, and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Those operations give the EU a real visibility despite the limited number of personnel deployed and certain shortfalls (dependency *vis-à-vis* NATO, command and control, planning assets, logistics, air- and sea-lift).

In this context, the EU is genuinely willing to cooperate with the UN on certain issues, but such cooperation may not be a priority for an EU that is involved in many other – and perhaps more important – issues, nor can such cooperation be seen to undermine the ability of the EU to pursue an independent policy. Moreover, cooperation with the UN is unlikely to lead to an increased participation of EU member states in UN-led peace operations.

Cooperation should, nevertheless, be further developed because:

- a) the deployment of troops in UN-led operations is only one aspect of a broad range of crisis management activities where the UN is likely to meet a higher readiness from the EU to cooperate;
- b) in EU-led operations, the UN will likely be involved in some way, either simultaneously with the EU or subsequently, which makes cooperation an absolute necessity.

I. Background

The EU is building autonomous capacities through the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

When the Brahimi report was released in August 2000, the European Union had already initiated a process of building autonomous capacities to enable it to conduct peace operations, through the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). At about the same time (September 2000), the UN and the EU began to meet at different levels to develop links and cooperation in the broad field of crisis management.

At the same time, contacts between the EU and UN have led to achievements in cooperation ...

After some initial misunderstandings (in particular, on the compatibility between ESDP and UN peace operations, i.e. the availability of “EU forces” for non-EU peace operations), these contacts have led to some significant achievements: points of contact have been established; high-level and working-level meetings take place regularly; and three themes of cooperation have been identified (conflict prevention, civilian and military aspects of crisis management, and regional issues: Western Balkans, Middle East and Africa)¹.

... while questions remain regarding the circumstances of operating with the UN.

In 2003, as EU capacity is realized and its role in peace operations is being defined, questions are raised about how and under what circumstances it will operate with the UN. As the UN faces the challenge of “troop-drain” in peacekeeping operations, how can the EU be engaged to assist, directly or indirectly?

II. Evolution and Likely Future Development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)

Initiated in 1998-99, ESDP aims to enable the EU to become a full actor in crisis management ...

The Build-up of Capacities

The EU initiated in 1998-99 the process of building capacities for “autonomous action backed up by credible military forces in order to respond to international crises”. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was aimed at enabling the EU to become a full actor in military and civilian crisis management, both in Europe and beyond.

... at the military level, capable of the Petersberg Tasks, ...

At the military level, under the Helsinki Headline Goal, the EU was to be “able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 60,000 persons capable of the full range of ‘Petersberg Tasks’”², which refer to a range of crisis management activities, including peace enforcement (called ‘peace-making’ in EU terminology³).

¹ See General Affairs Council of the EU, “EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management”, 11 June 2001. Also see “Agreement between the European Union and the United Nations establishing a framework for cooperation in the field of crisis management”, Council of the EU, 11 September 2003, and “Communication on EU-UN relations”, European Commission, 10 September 2003.

² Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 1999.

³ The ‘Petersberg Tasks’ include humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. See Article 17.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty, European Union, June 1997.

Simultaneously, a political-military structure was established in Brussels, composed of a Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Military Committee and a Military Staff⁴.

... as well as at the civilian level, where voluntary commitments have exceeded targets.

Operational capability, however, is constrained by shortfalls.

For civilian activities, EU Member States were asked to provide “up to 5,000 police officers to international missions across the range of crisis prevention and crisis management operations”⁵. In November 2002, EU Ministers “welcomed that the concrete targets” defined in the four categories of civilian crisis management activities (police, rule of law, civil protection and civilian administration) “had been exceeded through States’ voluntary commitments”⁶. In May 2003, the EU further declared its “operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks” in accordance with the Headline Goal, but also admitted that such a capability was still “limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls”⁷.

In the meantime, following the agreement (December 2002) between the EU and NATO on the implementation of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement⁸, EU-led operations can now be of two types:

EU-led operations can be with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities

- EU-led operations with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities;
- EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

But given shortfalls in many areas, the EU is likely to resort to NATO assets.

However, given the shortfalls of the EU in the area of planning assets, but also in command, control and communications (C3), strategic air- and sea-lift, and logistics, it is currently difficult to imagine an important EU-led operation that would be conducted without resorting to NATO assets, unless a country plays the role of the framework nation, thus providing the planning structure.

The increased crisis management role of the EU will contribute to UN goals of international peace and security.

As far as the relationship with the UN is concerned, the Council of the EU has reiterated that “the efforts made [in the ESDP field] will enable Europeans to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organizations such as the UN or the OSCE.”⁹ More generally, there is a sense within the EU that an increased role for the EU in crisis management activities will contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, which is the primary purpose of the UN.

EU Operations

In 2003, the EU launched its first three operations (Petersberg tasks):

⁴ This political-military structure was integrated into the Nice Treaty (December 2000). It is aimed at enabling the EU to plan (at the strategic level) and conduct ‘Petersberg Tasks’. While the PSC and the Military Committee are inter-governmental bodies, the Military Staff is part of the Secretariat of the Council.

⁵ Presidency Report on ESDP, Feira European Council, June 2000.

⁶ EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference at ministerial level, Brussels, 19 November 2002.

⁷ EU Capability Conference, Brussels, 19 May 2003.

⁸ EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 16 December 2002.

⁹ Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council, December 2000.

Of the three EU-led missions in 2003, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and the DRC, ...

- EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took over from the UN mission (UNMIBH) on 1 January 2003;
- Operation Concordia in Macedonia, which took over from the NATO operation Allied Harmony on 31 March 2003;
- Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was deployed from June 2003 to 1 September 2003, with France as the framework nation.

...two were deployed based on invitations by host states without formal UN mandate, ...

... while one followed a UN Security Council resolution.

The EUPM and Operation Concordia were deployed on the basis of an invitation by the respective host states and with no formal UN mandate. For the EUPM, a UN Security Council resolution “welcomed” the EU operation, but a similar resolution was adopted for Macedonia only in reference to the NATO operation. Operation Artemis was created following UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003).

TABLE 1 – EU OPERATIONS

Operation	Legal Basis	UNSC Resolution	Strength	Deployment
EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina	Invitation + EU Joint Action	Res. 1396 (5 March 2002) “welcomes the acceptance by the Steering Board of the PIC on 28 Feb. 2002 of the offer made by the EU to provide an EU Police Mission...”	530	January 2003- end 2005
Concordia Macedonia	Invitation + EU Joint Action	Res. 1371 (26 Sept. 2001) “strongly supports the establishment of a multinational security presence in Macedonia...” (refers to NATO)	350-450	March 2003 (6 months)
Artemis DRC	UNSC Res. 1484 ‘Chapter VII Res.’ + EU Joint Action	Res. 1484 (30 May 2003) “authorizes the deployment... of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force...”	1,800	15 June-1 st Sept. 2003

There are two ways to look at the current state of ESDP:

The optimistic view, ...

Likely Future Developments of ESDP

There are two ways to look at the current state of ESDP. The optimistic way is to praise the relative rapidity by which the EU turned words into actions, creating three operations in 2003, only five years after the ESDP process began in earnest and despite the political crisis that preceded the Iraq war. Along those lines, the EU should become increasingly involved in a broad range of activities, both civilian and military, in and outside of Europe.

... or the view stressing the modesty and shortfalls of current EU operations.

Another approach is to stress the modesty of current EU operations, the gap between the operations on the ground (that fall within ESDP) and the lack of cohesion at the political level (where CFSP¹⁰ is supposed to be defined), and the significant capability shortfalls. Taken together, the three operations total less than 3,000 personnel (compared to 42,000 deployed by NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo and 35,000 deployed by the UN in 15 operations) and are very limited

¹⁰ Common Foreign and Security Policy. ESDP covers the military and security dimensions of CFSP.

either in time or in scope. The EU is, furthermore, very dependent on NATO, a dependence that should last into the foreseeable future.

EU capabilities, political will and cohesion, will determine the EU's ability to deliver in the field of crisis management.

While the EU will no doubt be under pressure to deliver in the field of crisis management, its future ability to do so, however, will depend, on the one hand, on a combination of political will and the cohesion of the common foreign and security policy framework and, on the other hand, on its capabilities.

Political cohesion may be affected in several ways, ...

Political cohesion in the EU may be affected by: diverging approaches to CFSP/ESDP among EU member states; United States policy ('benevolence') towards the EU; EU-NATO relationship; and EU enlargement. The adoption of the European Constitution (in 2004) may give the EU higher visibility through, inter alia, the designation of a European Foreign Minister. This should also diminish confusion among external observers (at the UN, for example) about 'who does what' in EU foreign policy (between the Commission, the Secretariat of the Council and the Presidency).

... but even with such cohesion, the EU still has a capability issue, which will limit its ability to address the most demanding Petersberg tasks.

Assuming that such cohesion will exist, the EU will, nevertheless, be confronted by the capability issue, which will have a direct impact on the nature of the operations contemplated. In other words, if the EU is able to conduct *some* crisis management operations, it will remain difficult to conduct the most demanding Petersberg tasks (peace enforcement type operations).

That said, the EU is likely to look to regions beyond Europe.

The logic behind ESDP is that the EU be involved in crisis management without limitations, be they in terms of activities or geographical area of deployment. After Europe (Balkans), there is little doubt that the EU will look to Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus.

III. The Context of the EU-UN Relationship in Peace Operations: An Unlikely Contribution of the EU in the Military Sphere

Theoretical Convergence between UN Demand and EU Supply

ESDP appears to be an ideal tool for the UN, ...

A quick look at the UN and the EU in the field of peace operations may give the impression that there is a convergence between a UN demand and a European supply. In the context of the Brahimi Report, ESDP may appear to be an ideal tool for the UN. The UN needs states and regional organizations to provide troops and assets, while the EU has the troops and is building the assets. However, this convergence is only theoretical.

The UN has several wishes vis-à-vis the EU, ...

In the field of peace operations, UN wishes *vis-à-vis* the EU can be summarized as follows:

- The UN would like Europe to participate more in UN peace operations;
- The UN would like the EU to abide by UN rules (reference to a UN mandate);
- The UN would like the EU to go beyond Europe (to Africa in particular);

- The UN would like the EU to cooperate with the UN at both the institutional and operational levels (training¹¹/standards, equipment, etc.).

... but has concerns as well.

Additionally, the UN is concerned that EU crisis management policy might be developed at the expense of EU contributions to UN peace operations.

The EU's response to the wish-list will depend on national policies and autonomy.

Where the EU stands in relation to this wish-list is strongly determined by two sets of issues: the national policies of EU member states; and the imperative of autonomy.

The EU as a Reflection of National Policies

Perceptions of the UN are influenced by failures in the 1990s, limiting EU States' contributions to UN peace operations

The general position of the EU towards UN peace operations is, by and large, a reflection of the positions taken by EU states. In the field of crisis management, and notwithstanding the reform process following the Brahimi report, perceptions of the UN are still influenced by the failures of UN operations in the early 90s and characterized by a form of distrust. One consequence of this is that EU member states are largely absent from UN peace operations.

Financial contributions to UN peace operations are much greater than troop contribution ...

The EU contribution to the UN budget is about 37%; this amounts to 40% of the budget for peace operations. But, the EU provides only about 10% of the UN troops, with little or no prospect of an increase.

**TABLE 2 – THE EU AT THE UN
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION / CONTRIBUTION TO UN OPERATIONS**

EU share of UN regular budget	EU share of the UN peacekeeping operations budget	EU member states contribution to UN operations	EU (at 25) contribution to UN operations
37 %	40 %	9.2 % 3,223 out of 34,947 MONUC: 1 % 44 out of 4,575	13.6 % 4,765 out of 34,947

Sources: EU Website, May 2003 and Monthly Summary of Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations as of 31 May 2003, UN Website.

... indicating the unwillingness of the EU to participate in UN peace operations.

This gives a clear idea about the unwillingness of European states to participate in UN peace operations, be it on an individual basis or through the framework of the EU. It is noteworthy, that the recent EU readiness to become involved in the DRC was not expressed in contributions to the UN mission in the Congo (MONUC), in which EU member states account for only 1% of deployed personnel.

The Imperative of Autonomy

Of the four principles that guide EU cooperation with international organizations ...

Four principles have been declared to guide EU cooperation with international organizations: added value, interoperability, visibility and decision-making autonomy¹².

¹¹ The Italian Presidency of the EU is preparing a conference on training.

... autonomy ...	Autonomy of action has been one of the key concepts of the ESDP process. It primarily refers to NATO, but can also apply more generally to the UN, even if ESDP has not been developed <i>in reference to</i> the UN nor has the latter played a significant role in the development of this policy.
... and visibility are key concepts, both of which may not be compatible with a close relation with the UN.	The EU is similarly seeking visibility. It follows that the EU would see with great concern any development that may reduce its autonomy and visibility, and a close and constraining relation with the UN may not always be compatible with this desire for autonomy and visibility.
This concludes that the EU-UN relationship in peace operations will remain very limited.	These two elements lead us to conclude that the relationship between the EU and the UN in peace operations will most likely remain very limited and be addressed on a case-by-case basis rather than in a formal and institutionalized way. There have been major developments in cooperation between the UN and the EU since 2000 ¹³ and the relationship is likely to develop further. But, such cooperation is likely to have a limited impact on EU contributions to UN peace operations.
	This view seems to be confirmed when looking at the issues of mandate and chain of command.
	<i>UN Mandate: Not Always a Necessity</i>
The EU does not consider itself to be a Chapter VIII regional arrangement.	The question of the mandate ¹⁴ for EU operations is important because it is one aspect that possibly links the EU and the UN. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed within the UN, the EU does not consider itself to be a Chapter VIII regional arrangement and has never invoked this chapter to justify an action under ESDP.
The need for a UN mandate is not clearly defined in EU policy ...	As far as mandates for EU peace operations are concerned, EU policy on obtaining a UN mandate has not been clearly defined. EU official documents refer only to the need to act “in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter” ¹⁵ , while the UN and the OSCE are regularly mentioned as “leading organizations”.
... but seems to be determined by the nature of the operation and the area of deployment:...	The need for a UN mandate seems to be determined by the nature of the operation (coercive or non coercive) and the area of deployment (Europe or outside of Europe).

¹² See “EU cooperation with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management”, Presidency Report on ESDP, Annex V, Göteborg European Council, June 2001.

¹³ On 13 September 2000, for the first time, a ministerial troika of the EU met the UN Secretary General in New York. This event was followed by meetings at different levels, and on the EU side, cooperation between the UN and the EU was further materialized in a document adopted by the Council in June 2001; see General Affairs Council of the EU, “EU-UN cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management”, 11 June 2001. In the civilian sphere, see “EU cooperation with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management”, Presidency Report on ESDP, Annex V, Göteborg European Council, June 2001.

¹⁴ A UN mandate here refers to a UN Security Council resolution.

¹⁵ Presidency Report on ESDP, Nice European Council, December 2000.

...the EU being more likely to seek a UN mandate for an operation outside of Europe and/or with a coercive nature.

Simply put, the EU has sought a UN mandate for an EU-led operation when the operation contemplated is coercive (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) and/or outside Europe (Operation Artemis in DRC), but seems to assume that a UN mandate is not legally required when the operation is non-coercive and in Europe (the EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Operation Concordia in Macedonia; see Appendix).

This raises political and legal questions for operations that do not neatly follow this division ...

However, it is unclear what EU policy will be in other cases, which raises political and legal questions. Whether a UN mandate will be sought for an operation in Africa that is consent-based and non-coercive is not clearly established. Nor is this clear in the case of an operation that would be consent-based *but* coercive. In Europe, this could be the case of an EU force taking over from SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina¹⁶. In Africa, a parallel could be drawn with the French-led operation Licorne in Ivory Coast (that would have fallen under Chapter VII of the UN Charter had a Security Council resolution created it¹⁷).

... as well as the issue of the link between political and legal aspects of a mandate ...

This raises the issue of the link between the political and legal aspects of a mandate. If there is little doubt that the EU would act in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, this approach is not without risks, for a UNSC resolution provides more than just a legal basis for action. A UNSC resolution also provides a legitimacy and impartiality that an invitation from the host state does not. It is a public document that clarifies the nature of the operation and its level of coerciveness (Chapter VI *versus* Chapter VII), making the operation more visible. In this way, it helps to attenuate possible resentment from the South and criticism about 'European neo-colonialism' (particularly in Africa), as long as the UNSC resolution is not perceived to be a blank cheque to the EU.

... which could undermine UN authority.

It seems clear that EU member states are somewhat reluctant to condition their operations to a Security Council vote, especially in cases when a) the operation is to be conducted with resort to NATO assets and b) they consider that such a vote is not legally required. But at a time when UN authority is challenged, the EU runs the risk of further undermining that authority by not making clear their political commitment to the UN, beyond a strictly legal requirement.

Chain of Command: Towards the Sub-Contracting Model in the Military Sphere

An involvement of the political-military structure, rather than involvement of troops, formally constitutes an EU operation.

What constitutes formally an EU operation is the involvement of the political-military structure of the EU (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, Military Staff) rather than whether there is an involvement of troops. Here, the bottom line is that an EU-led operation must be placed under the political control and the strategic direction of the PSC. This is a formal

¹⁶ The mandate of the SFOR has been renewed every year since 1996. The relevant UNSC resolutions authorize the SFOR to "fulfill the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Dayton Peace Agreement", which only refers to NATO.

¹⁷ UNSC Resolution 1464 (2003) was adopted five months after the deployment of operation Licorne, and "welcomes the deployment of French troops...".

Hence, an EU-led operation must be placed under political control and direction of the PSC ...

... and cannot be subordinated to higher authority, including the UN.

The EU, therefore, would prefer the sub-contracting model.

However, subordination to the UN in civilian aspects of crisis management seems to be more acceptable.

Even though the EU is a promising actor, cooperation with the UN is still hampered by several factors.

requirement¹⁸, even in the case of an EU-led operation with resort to NATO assets.

The combination of this requirement with the general reluctance of EU member states to be involved in UN-led operations makes it very hard to conceive of an EU operation being subordinated to a UN chain of command. The political-military structure of the EU cannot be subordinated to any kind of higher authority (see Appendix). In practice, it is therefore difficult to imagine the EU contributing ‘EU contingents’ to a UN-led operation, i.e. EU contingents placed under the strategic command of a UN representative.

Consequently, the EU would likely prefer the sub-contracting model (see Appendix), by which the UN creates an operation but subcontracts its implementation to the EU, thus preserving the autonomy of EU decisions. In line with this model, the EU could also take part in a UN-coordinated multidimensional operation in which the EU would be responsible for one or more pillars, without being formally subordinated to the UN (see Appendix).

However, a distinction must be made between the military and the civilian aspects of crisis management. Subordination to the UN in the civilian sphere appears to be much more acceptable than in the military sphere. In the civilian sphere (police, judiciary, economic and humanitarian aid, etc.), EU texts explicitly state that EU assets may be “used in operations conducted by lead agencies, such as the UN or the OSCE, or EU-led autonomous missions”¹⁹.

IV. Various Possibilities for Interaction with the UN: Opportunities and Constraints

The EU is certainly the regional actor that offers the UN the most promising opportunities of cooperation in crisis management and is genuinely willing to do so. However, despite regular commitments made to strengthen the UN (including most recently in the *European Security Strategy* statement by Javier Solana²⁰), and to improve cooperation between them²¹, cooperation with the UN is still not considered a priority for the EU and must not be seen to undermine in any way the ability of the EU to pursue its own policy.

¹⁸ See ‘Political and Security Committee’, Annex III, Presidency Report on ESDP, Nice European Council, December 2000.

¹⁹ See Presidential Conclusions, Feira European Council, June 2000, and “EU cooperation with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management”, Annex to the Presidency Report on ESDP, Göteborg European Council, June 2001.

²⁰ The European Security Strategy states that “Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, must be a European priority”, Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, 20 June 2003.

²¹ See “Agreement between the European Union and the United Nations establishing a framework for cooperation in the field of crisis management”, Council of the EU, 11 September 2003.

Theirs is an unbalanced relationship: the UN needs the EU ...

...and the EU lays down the conditions for cooperation.

While the UN remains a legalizing and legitimizing body, it is not a primary partner for the EU in crisis management.

There is, however, scope for cooperation.

There are several aspects of operations that could warrant increased cooperation between the UN and the EU ...

... including strategic planning and assistance at the operational level.

An 'Europeanisation' of assistance to African peacekeeping forces is foreseeable, increasing UN-EU cooperation in Africa.

For the UN, cooperation with the EU is a necessity, but should be developed with a clear understanding of what can and cannot be expected from the EU. The UN-EU relationship is an unbalanced relationship: the UN must beg for increased European involvement in peace operations. But it is the EU that will most likely lay down the conditions for cooperation. It is in this context that the UN must identify where cooperation can most realistically be developed with the EU.

One of the key assumptions of this analysis is that the EU will most likely develop its peace operations policy outside the UN framework. The UN will remain a legalizing/legitimizing body but not a primary partner for the EU in crisis management. Such an assessment does not mean, however, that there is no scope for cooperation between the UN and the EU, as is stated in the latest "Agreement between the European Union and the United Nations establishing a framework for cooperation in the field of crisis management"²². There are two broad reasons for this:

- the deployment of troops in UN-led operations is only one aspect of the wide range of crisis management activities. There are many other areas where the UN is likelier to meet a higher readiness from the EU to cooperate;
- in several scenarios for EU-led operations, the UN will in all likelihood be involved in some way, either simultaneously with the EU or subsequently, which makes cooperation an absolute necessity.

Cooperation beyond Troop Deployment

Even if the EU does not participate directly in UN-led operations through troop deployment, other aspects of those operations may require increased cooperation between the UN and the EU. In addition to the financing aspect (voluntary contributions for specific operations), UN cooperation with the EU is possible in planning, rapid deployment, logistics, equipment, training, standards, procedures and concepts.

As far as planning is concerned, the EU could only help in strategic planning since it currently lacks an operational planning structure. EU states could play a role at the operational level by providing the headquarters for a force, following what SHIRBRIG did in 2000 in Ethiopia-Eritrea before UNMEE took over. However, this model has not been looked at closely on the EU side.

Moreover, in the medium to long term, an 'Europeanisation'²³ is conceivable of some aspects (if not all) of the French²⁴ and British programmes for training and equipping African armed forces to participate in peace missions. For the EU, this would improve the efficiency of such programmes and allow the EU to support African peacekeeping without taking too many risks. Such a process would also pave the way to better cooperation between the UN and the EU in Africa (which

²² Ibid.

²³ These programmes could be placed under aegis of the EU.

²⁴ The French programme is called RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix).

should also include African regional organizations). For the UN, it would also be a way to involve the two European states that are permanent members of the Security Council.

Training and equipping of UN peacekeepers and civilian staff could be other areas of cooperation.

By the same token, the EU could provide assistance to the UN to help UN peacekeepers meet UN standards. In particular, cooperation could be envisaged in EU training and equipping of police officers and other civilian experts for UN operations.

Furthermore, making military staff available to the UN, technical assistance in general, ...

In line with the recommendations of the Brahimi report ('mission leaders', 'on-call lists'), civilian and military personnel coming from EU states should continue to be made available to the UN on an individual basis. More generally, technical assistance (i.e. political/military expertise) by the EU political and military structure (the Military Committee and the Military Staff in particular) is also a possibility.

... various activities in the peacebuilding phase, ...

The EU and the UN already cooperate in the peacebuilding phase, especially in the civilian sphere. The UN has wide experience in peacebuilding while the EU has assets and resources that the UN lacks. In the field of institution-building, the rule of law (police and judiciary), electoral supervision, humanitarian aid, and economic reconstruction, the UN and the EU have comparative advantages that would constitute a real added value if coordinated effectively.

... and the fields of lessons learned, procedures, concepts and terminology, all offer possibilities for UN-EU cooperation.

Finally, cooperation could also be pursued in the fields of lessons learned, procedures, concepts and terminology. The transition from UNMIBH to the EUPM has provided a good opportunity for exchanging lessons learned but this could also be explored in other operations (e.g. SHIRBRIG and UNMEE in Ethiopia-Eritrea, Artemis and MONUC in the DRC). Regarding terminology, the use of terms and definitions should be harmonized, starting with the EU replacing the confusing term "peacemaking" in the Petersberg tasks list with the term "peace enforcement".

Cooperation where the UN and the EU are involved simultaneously or sequentially

Beyond these potential areas of cooperation, it is possible that EU operations may be deployed in places where the UN is already present or where the UN is mandated to take over an EU operation. The following scenarios are possible:

Where UN and EU-led forces are deployed simultaneously or sequential, cooperation is essential, ...

1. EU deployment following a UN operation (UNMIBH-EUPM);
2. EU deployment alongside a UN operation (Artemis-MONUC, KFOR-UNMIK²⁵);
3. EU deployment for a limited time before a UN take-over (Artemis-MONUC2, INTERFET-UNTAET, SHIRBRIG-UNMEE).
4. EU component of a multidimensional operation in which the UN provides another component (the pillar structure in Kosovo).

²⁵ The cases not involving the EU are taken as examples of scenarios where the EU could play a similar role.

... as are interoperability, compatibility and information exchange.

As these scenarios are not just theoretical, it is crucial that the UN and the EU work to ensure interoperability of activities on the ground and compatibility, in case the UN needs to take over an EU-led operation (standards²⁶, planning, equipment, mandates, etc.). Insofar as the UN is seen as providing an exit strategy for the EU (scenario 3, which is favored by the EU), possible implications of such a scenario must be further explored by the UN and the EU, both individually and jointly. For the UN, one question to be addressed is how much it can accept from the EU, in terms of division of labour and of imposition by the EU of its own approach to the mandate of the EU operation. The simultaneous presence of the two organizations on the ground also implies some exchange of information between the Situation Centres²⁷.

V. Conclusion and Recommendations

The EU has created high expectations regarding its operational capability. But given its reluctance to be involved in UN peace operations, the UN should:

** stress civilian aspects of crisis management;*

** stress areas in which EU is willing and able to contribute;*

** insist on the need for closer cooperation;*

** sensitize the EU on the risks of a two-speed crisis management.*

Since the EU declared its operational capability in May 2003, the pressure has been relatively high on the EU to live up to its promises; in the short to medium term, this may create opportunities for the UN to press the EU to do more in crisis management beyond Europe. However, given the reluctance of the EU to be involved in UN-led (military) peace operations, in its cooperation with the EU:

1. The UN should stress the civilian aspects of crisis management, where it is more likely to meet EU openness than on the military aspects.
2. The UN should stress efforts that the EU can produce short of troops – i.e. training, equipment, logistics, and planning – particularly in Africa (the EU should be sensitive to the argument that it must compensate its “physical absence” by a presence at other levels).
3. The UN should insist in its discussions with the EU on the need to develop closer cooperation with UN since both will inevitably be present simultaneously on the ground, with the UN being possibly being part of the EU’s exit strategy (as when the UN takes over an EU operation). Such a role for the UN, considering its political and military implications, should be further debated by both the UN and the EU and not be accepted unconditionally. This could take the form of joint exercises.
4. In the same vein, the UN should sensitize the EU to the risks of a two-speed crisis management: rich and robust when conducted by the North (NATO, EU, “coalitions of the willing”) / poor and often ill-equipped when conducted by the South (UN, ECOWAS), and on the necessity to fill the gap between the two levels.

²⁶ The issue of the standards was raised when UNMEE took over the SHIRBRIG in Ethiopia-Eritrea.

²⁷ Such a cooperation is agreed upon in the “Agreement between the European Union and the United Nations establishing a framework for cooperation in the field of crisis management”, Council of the EU, 11 September 2003.

Furthermore,

** the UN should be better informed about ESDP;*

** the UN should stress its know-how and added value;*

** the UN should remind the EU of its formal commitments to strengthen the UN;*

** and, finally, information-sharing mechanisms should be strengthened.*

Other recommendations:

5. The UN (both the Secretariat and member states) should be more informed regarding EU policy in the area of crisis management (ESDP).
6. The UN should be more aggressive towards the EU in stressing the know-how and added value of the UN in various areas of crisis management activities, especially in the civilian sphere.
7. The UN should remind the EU of its formal commitments to strengthen the UN, when pursuing practical cooperation with the EU (the recent *European Security Strategy* clearly states that “Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, must be a European priority”²⁸).
8. Exchange of officers between the two Secretariats should be promoted; liaison bureaux should be strengthened.

²⁸ Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, European Council, 20 June 2003.

APPENDIX: SCENARIOS OF EU OPERATIONS IN RELATION TO THE UN

